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Modal realism
Modal realism is the view propounded by David Kellogg Lewis that all possible worlds are as real as the actual world. It is based on the following tenets: possible worlds exist; possible worlds are not different in kind from the actual world; possible worlds are irreducible entities; the term ''actual'' in ''actual world'' is indexical, i.e. any subject can declare their world to be the actual one, much as they
label the place they are "here" and the time they are "now".
== The term ''possible world'' ==
The term goes back to Leibniz's theory of possible worlds, used to analyse necessity, possibility, and similar modal notions. In short: the actual world is regarded as merely one among an infinite set of logically possible worlds, some "nearer" to the actual world and some more remote. A proposition is ''necessary'' if it is true in all possible worlds, and ''possible'' if it is true in at least one.
抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』
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